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 Spending time together? Effects on the retirement decision from partner’s labour market status1 Anders Boman2 
Abstract: 
In this paper we study retirement decisions and more specifically, the influence of a partner’s labour 
market status on this decision. We use information from three waves of the Survey of Health Ageing 
and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), providing information on a wide range of variables, including 
economic, social, as well as health variables not only of the respondent but also of the partner of the 
respondent, if any.  Most importantly, we are able analyse the transition into retirement rather than the 
state of being retired and also to distinguish between different degrees of labour market attachment of 
the partner. Initially, we find that having a partner who is retired or a homemaker increases the 
likelihood of retirement, whereas an unemployed partner or a partner who is not working due to 
permanent sickness or disability has no statistically significant effect. However, dividing the sample 
into men and women, we find that the effects differ substantially between these two groups. The 
probability of retirement among men is not influenced by their partner’s labour market status, and 
among women we only find a statistically significant effect of having a partner who is retired. Our 
findings are robust to variations in the definition of retirement and subsamples.  
 
Keywords: retirement, labour market, family, joint leisure, SHARE 
JEL Classifications: J26, J14  
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10.6103/SHARE.w4.111) or SHARE wave 1 and 2 release 2.6.0, as of November 29 2013 (DOI: 
10.6103/SHARE.w1.260 and 10.6103/SHARE.w2.260) or SHARELIFE release 1, as of November 
24th 2010 (DOI: 10.6103/SHARE.w3.100). The SHARE data collection has been primarily funded by 
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of funding institutions) 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
An ageing population is one of the great challenges for many countries in the near future. As we tend 
to live longer, we will on average work for a smaller part of life unless we also increase the age at 
which we retire. One way of dealing with this could be to increase retirement age as life expectancy of 
the population increases. However, this does not seem to happen and instead the opposite is often true, 
as there has been a trend towards earlier retirement “making retirement a midlife experience and not a 
marker of old age” (p. 64)  (Reitzes & Mutran, 2004). Since the 1950s, although health has improved 
substantially, employment at older ages has decreased rather than increased  (Milligan & Wise, 2012). 
This could be important as the dependency ratio (the number of pensioners relative to the number of 
contributors in public pension schemes) is predicted to increase in many EU countries, and to increase 
substantially for some (see table 53, p. 202 in (European Commission, 2009). Large differences in the 
size of these changes are expected, for instance due to migration patterns,  but even in countries in the 
lower part of the range of increase are expected face increases of their dependency ratios by about 
25% until 2060, which is still a substantial increase (OECD, 2012). A recent working paper, analysing 
differences in health and working capacity between 12 OECD countries (Milligan & Wise, 2012) 
found large differences over time but also between countries, concluding that some countries have 
more unused working capacity than others.  
People do tend to work less as they get older, and employment rates are lower in age groups 
approaching retirement age  (Hairault, Langot, & Sopraseuth, 2010).  (Samwick, 1998) finds a spike in 
retirement at age 62 that cannot be explained by the financial variables included in the model. 3 
However, a later study found no retirement effect from approaching what is perceived as standard 
retirement age  (Asch, Haider, & Zissimopoulo, 2005). 
There are many studies on the effects of health on labour force participation  (Christensen & 
Kallestrup-Lamb, 2012) (Siddiqui, 1997) (Au, Crossley, & Schellhorn, 2005) (Kalwij & Vermeulen, 
2008). Other research has shown that receiving a medical diagnosis is an important determinant of 
retirement planning for both men and women, even more important that economic factors. The size of 
the effects depends on the type of diagnosis.  (Gupta & Larsen, 2010) 
However, it is difficult to accurately measure health and its effects on retirement, see for instance 
(McGarry, 2002). The difficulties can be grouped into several different sources of error. Firstly, the 
most common measure of health is self-reported health. One problem with this measure is that those 
who have retired, or wish to retire, may report worse health than their actual health as a means to 
justify retirement, often referred to as “justification bias”. However, the conclusions regarding this 
bias are not generally agreed upon. For instance (Kreider & Pepper, 2007) find that non-workers 
                                                     
3 62 being the age when Social Security benefits can first be collected.  
3 
 
generally over report disability whereas (Benítez-Silva, Buchinsky, Chan, Cheidvasser, & Rust, 2004) 
are unable to reject the hypothesis that self-reported disability is an unbiased indicator. It is also 
possible that those how have already retired report being in worse health in order to justify their 
retirement (as discussed in (Disney, Emmerson, & Wakefield, 2006)). 
Health may also influence the retirement decision through life expectancy, as living longer requires 
either greater assets or that one retires later in order for finances to suffice. (Hamermesh, 1984) finds 
small or no effects on retirement age from life expectancy, as proxied by longevity of parents. Instead 
of working longer people who expect to live longer consume less, even though the reduction in 
consumption is too small to compensate for the longer life expectancy. 
Several studies have analysed the influence of economic factors on the decision to leave the labour 
market, see for instance  (García-Pérez, Jiménez-Martín, & Sánchez-Martín, 2013) (Hanel & Riphahn, 
2012) (Asch, Haider, & Zissimopoulo, 2005). However, it has also been found that other factors are 
influential in the timing of retirement. Among many other things, the retirement decision is influenced 
by spouse retirement, where couples try to coordinate their retirement timings  (Blau, 1998) (Bingley 
& Lanot, 2007)  (Schirle, 2008) (Casanova, 2010)  (Hospido & Zamarro, 2014). These studies found 
that the presence of a retired spouse or partner will increase the likelihood of retirement.  (Hospido & 
Zamarro, 2014)  find that this effect is only present for women, for whom having a retired husband 
increases the likelihood of retiring by 21 percent. However,  (Hospido & Zamarro, 2014) define 
retirement very broadly, as working in one wave of the survey and not working in the next wave is 
defined as retirement, regardless of whether the individual became unemployed, sick or disabled, left 
the labour market becoming a home maker, or actually retired.  (Blau, 1998) also only defines the 
labour market status of each spouse as employed or unemployed.  (Bingley & Lanot, 2007) define 
retirement as the transition into at least one year of non-work for older workers.  (Schirle, 2008) on the 
other hand looks at labour force participation.  (Blanchet & Debrand, 2008) analyse preferences for 
retirement and find substantial effects from both monetary and non-monetary determinants. However, 
the desire to retire is, although closely linked to actual retirement, not the same as to actual retirement. 
 (Schirle, 2008) found that the increased female labour force participation has led to men retiring later 
in life, as spouses try to coordinate their exits from the labour market. Married men prolong working 
life as they wait until their wives retire before they retire themselves. Furthermore, it has been found 
that the influence a person has in a relationship affects how satisfied he or she will be with the 
retirement decision and that satisfaction is also influenced by the spouse’s decision to retire or not. If 
retirement increases the partners influence in the relationship, satisfaction of the retiree is reduced  
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(Szinovacz & Davey, 2005).4 Either couples try to coordinate their exits from the labour market or 
husbands are unwilling to give up their role as providers as this could be an important part of their 
identity (Akerlof & Kranton, 2000).  
“People behave myopically, consuming more than their knowledge of their horizon would enable them 
to and will keep a constant standard of living” (p. 369 (Hamermesh, 1984)). 
There are many different definitions of retirement and depending on what definition is used different 
results may be reached. For instance  (McGarry, 2002) uses the self-predicted probability of being 
retired after the age of 62, which may or may not be realised.  (Gupta & Larsen, 2010) use survey 
response regarding current labour market status, where retirement is defined by the respondent 
answering that they have “stopped working permanently”. However, having stopped working 
permanently, although having the same labour market effect, is not the same as formally retiring from 
work.  
Regardless of what exactly is meant by retirement, it is in many cases defined as a state variable equal 
to one if the person is retired and zero if not. This is in most cases due to data availability where the 
researcher only has cross-sectional data. In this paper we utilise data from the Survey of Health, 
Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), a survey with an extensive list of variables including 
economic, health and family variables. The fact that this data set is longitudinal allows us to define 
retirement as a change of state rather than a state, such that retirement is defined as the person working 
in one wave of the survey but being retired in the next wave of the survey. Furthermore, the scope of 
the survey allows us to capture many of the effects which have only been analysed separately in 
previous papers. We use this extensive list of variables to analyse the probability of retiring given both 
traditional socioeconomic factors, as well as family, health and job-related variables, most importantly 
we are able to distinguish between different degrees of labour market attachment of the partner. 
The rest of the paper is organised such that section 2 presents the framework of the analysis. Section 3 
presents the data set used and section 4 presents variable definitions. This is followed by section 5 
with descriptive statistics and section 6 presents estimation results. Section 7 concludes.   
2 FRAMEWORK 
Previous research has shown that the decision to retire is to a large extent influenced by economic, 
health, and social factors.  The decision to retire is similar to other labour supply choices, as it 
                                                     
4 (Mazzoco, Ruiz, & Yamaguchi, 2014) tells an interesting story of how labour supply varies over time 
when men and women enter and exit marriage, where men (women) start increasing (decreasing) 
hours worked up to two years before marriage. Women also increase their labour supply up to three 
years before a divorce.  
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balances the trade-off between income/consumption and leisure. Therefore, if the utility of retiring is 
greater than the utility of continuing work the utility maximising individual will choose to retire.  
We assume a utility function 
𝑈 = 𝑓(𝐶, 𝐿,𝐻) 
where C is consumption, L is leisure, H is health. 
Consumption in turn depends on income, such that  
𝐶 = 𝑔(𝑊,𝐵,𝐾) 
where W denotes income from work and B is income from alternative sources, such as benefits, and K 
is income from capital.  
Voluntary retirement means that the utility when retired is expected to be greater than the utility from 
continued work.  
𝑅 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑈𝑅 > 𝑈𝑤 
If a person goes into retirement, income from work (W) will equal zero whereas income from benefits 
(B) will increase.5 There is no direct effect on capital income (K) from the decision to retire. The 
replacement rate of retirement benefits is generally less than one, such that the total effect on 
consumption (C) will be negative. Consequently, there must be some offsetting effect to balance this 
negative change in consumption, in order for a person to choose to retire. For instance, this could be 
due to a reduction in discomfort from health related issues or increased utility from leisure.  
The utility from leisure may then be argued to be greater if you have a partner to spend that leisure 
with. If the partner is working any additional leisure from retirement will not be spent with the partner 
as he or she is at work. If, on the other hand, the partner is already retired, or is at home for other 
reasons, the additional leisure can be spent together. The presence of a partner who is at home could 
therefore be argued to increase the likelihood of retirement. Furthermore, it is not only the current 
labour market status of the partner that matters. If one expects the partner to remain at home, the 
expected utility of (joint) leisure is greater than that if one expects the partner to return to work in the 
future. Permanent withdrawal from the labour market by the partner could therefore be expected to 
increase the likelihood of retirement more than temporary joblessness.  
                                                     
5  This is only partially true however, as some may retire but still keep some minor tasks and 
consequently retains some income from work.  
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In this paper we treat the retirement decision as an individual decision influenced by the labour market 
status of the partner. Consequently, we do not treat the decision to retire as being only dependent on 
individual factors, nor do we treat it as a fully joint decision. The analysis is on an individual level, as 
we want to be able to compare unmarried individuals to married individuals, where the partners differ 
in their labour market attachment.   
3 DATA 
In this paper we will be using data from the three main waves from the Survey of Health, Ageing and 
Retirement in Europe (SHARE). Wave 1 was collected in 2004/05, wave 2 in 2006/07, and wave 4 in 
2010/11. 6  SHARE is a cross-national household panel survey collecting data on health, socio-
economic variables, as well as social and family networks. The survey population consists of non-
institutionalised individuals over the age of 50, as well as their partners or spouses irrespective of age.7 
However, other members of the household of the respondent can also be included. For instance one 
adult aged 50 or more may live in the home of his or her parents whereby all three individuals may be 
included in the survey.8 Alternatively one elderly parent may live with his or her child’s family. 
Consequently, most households will include one or two individuals but in some cases more. However, 
for unknown reasons quite a large share9 of respondents reporting being “married and living with 
spouse” no spouse is registered in the data.  
The survey is designed to be cross-nationally comparable and follows the design of the U.S. Health 
and Retirement Study and the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing. For a brief description of the 
data, see  (Mazzonna & Peracchi, 2012). For details on the steps taken to ensure cross-country 
comparability please see  (Börsch-Supan & Jürges, 2005). 
As can be seen from table 1, the number of countries included in each wave of the survey has 
increased over time, but what countries are included has varied, as has the number of respondents in 
                                                     
6 Wave 3 (SHARELIFE) is different from the other three waves, as it focuses on detailed background 
information which can be linked to the three other waves. 
7 More precisely, in Wave 1 the target population is defined as “All individuals born in 1954 or earlier, 
speaking the official language of the country and not living abroad or in an institution such as a prison 
during the duration of the field work, and their spouses/partners independent of age” p. 8  (SHARE, 
Release Guide 2.6.0 Waves 1 & 2, 2013). In Wave 2 the focus was on re-contacting respondents from 
the first wave but a refresher sample was drawn. However only cohorts born in 1955 and 1956 were 
oversampled to keep the sample representative of the population 50 years old and older. (SHARE, 
Wave 2, 2013). In Wave 4 the target population was “all persons born 1960 or earlier having their 
regular domicile in the respective country, together with their current partners/spouses, independent of 
age  (SHARE, Release Guide 1.1.0 Wave 4, 2013).  
8 This is true for Wave 1 of the survey, in waves 2 and 4 the number of age-eligible respondents per 
household is limited such that only one respondent and his or her partner is interviewed even if there 
are more age-eligible persons in the household.  
9 For about 17% of all observations for married respondents there is no information on the partner. 
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each wave. Although the number of respondents in each country varies the survey is designed to give a 
representative sample.   
TABLE 1 - NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS BY COUNTRY AND WAVE 
  Country Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 4   
 Year 2004/05 2006/07 2010/11  
 Austria 1.893 1.341 5.286  
 Germany 3.008 2.569 1.572  
 Sweden 3.053 2.745 1.951  
 Netherlands 2.979 2.661 2.762  
 Spain 2.396 2.228 3.570  
 Italy 2.559 2.983 3.583  
 France 3.193 2.968 5.857  
 Denmark 1.707 2.616 2.276  
 Greece 2.898 3.243 -  
 Switzerland 1.004 1.462 3.750  
 Belgium 3.827 3.169 5.300  
 Israel 2.598 - -  
 Czechia - 2.830 6.118  
 Poland - 2.467 1.724  
 Ireland - 1.134 -  
 Hungary - - 3.076  
 Portugal - - 2.080  
 Slovenia - - 2.756  
  Estonia  -  - 6.828   
 
In this paper we only include those countries that contributed to at least two waves of the survey. This 
means that only 13 of the countries will be covered in this paper (Austria, Germany, Sweden, 
Netherlands, Spain, Italy, France, Denmark, Greece, Switzerland, Belgium, Czechia, Poland).  
As we are only interested in respondents at risk of retiring, all individuals who are already retired 
when they are first included in the survey are excluded from the analysis, reducing the sample 
substantially. Furthermore, as we are interested in the transition into retirement we only keep 
individuals for whom we have at least two consecutive observations and where the respondent is 
working at the time he or she first appears in the survey, giving us a period of possible transition into 
retirement. 10 This further reduces our sample and in the remaining sample there are almost 16.000 
respondents with two consecutive observations (i.e. one period of possible transition) and almost 
11.000 respondents with three observations (i.e. two periods of possible transition). This gives us a 
                                                     
10 Although rarely, it does happen that respondents are in the survey in Wave 1 and Wave 4 but not in 
Wave 2. Those individuals are not included in the analysis as time between observations becomes too 
long. Time between Wave 1 and Wave 4 is typically 7 years 
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total of 27.000 respondents with over 38.000 periods of possible transitions between them. However, 
since there are many instances of incomplete data in one or more of our variables of interest, this 
number will be reduced further in the regression analysis due to missing information on one or more 
variables. 
4 ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION 
As the outcome variable, retirement, is binary in its nature, logit estimation is used. Although the 
SHARE dataset is longitudinal, the panel is far from balanced and very short. The benefits from the 
panel structure, apart from the possibility to analyse the transition into retirement rather than the state 
of being retired, are therefore limited. A panel logit is estimated as a robustness check, see Appendix. 
4.1 DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
In this paper we make use of the panel design of the SHARE survey and define retirement as a change 
of state rather than a state, such that retirement is defined as the person working in one wave of the 
survey but being retired in the next wave of the survey. We consequently have two different 
opportunities to observe the transition into retirement, between wave 1 and wave 2 or between wave 2 
and wave 4.11 Another possible definition would be to look at it from the other direction, such that we 
would define retirement as being retired in on one wave but not in the previous wave. However, 
justification bias can be expected to be stronger when retired, than prior to retirement. Furthermore, as 
soon as an individual enters retirement several factors disappear from the survey (such as expected 
replacement rates etc.) which makes the chosen specification preferable.  
This still leaves the question of what we mean by retirement. Different people may have different 
views of when they have actually retired, such that some people will officially retire but still keep 
some tasks or duties while others stop working altogether, some claiming pension benefits while 
others do not. This border is far from easy to draw, but we rely on the individuals answer to the survey 
question “In general, how would you describe your current situation?”. The available alternatives are: 
1. Retired 
2. Employed or self-employed (including working for family business) 
3. Unemployed 
4. Permanently sick or disabled 
5. Homemaker 
97. Other (specify) 
                                                     
11 As previously mentioned, wave 3 of the SHARE survey is backward looking, providing life history 
information, adding information to the other waves of the survey, but not constituting a wave of its 
own.  
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We base our definition of retirement on the alternative chosen, arguing that the individual’s answer 
will reflect how that individual regards his or her own situation.12 Although returns to the labour 
market from retirement are observed in the data, a person reporting to be retired can be seen as more 
permanently removed from the labour market than others. Consequently, our dependent variable will 
equal one if the respondent answers that he or she is working in one wave of the survey, and in the 
following wave answers that he or she is retired. 
We consequently define the outcome variable as 
𝑅𝑖𝑖 = 1 𝑖𝑓𝑟𝑖𝑖 = 0 𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑟𝑖𝑖+1 = 1  
𝑅𝑖𝑖 = 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑟𝑖𝑖 = 0 𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑟𝑖𝑖+1 = 0 
Where Rit is a discrete classification variable equal to 1 if the person is defined as retired and 0 
otherwise. rit is the self-reported variable, equal to 1 if the respondent reports being retired at time t or 
0 if the respondent reports not being retired at time t. If rit = 1 the person is dropped from the data as 
he or she is not at risk of retirement when already retired.  
Since we are not able to observe whether or not the respondent retires after wave 4 of the survey, 
information from that wave will not be included in the analysis, apart from retirement.  
4.2 EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
Our main variable of interest is the marital status of the individual. From the information in the 
SHARE data we can first construct a number of binary dummies 
- Never married 
- Married, including registered partnership and regardless of if living together or not13 
- Divorced 
- Widowed 
Each dummy takes the value one if true, and zero otherwise. The category “married” includes 
registered partnership, and both married spouses and registered partners will be referred to as 
“partners”.  
                                                     
12 The construction of the questionnaire gives follow-up questions regarding any paid job performed 
even if the respondent answers that he or she is not working12. This allows the survey to report the 
amount of work actually being done by the respondent. However, in this study we only utilise the 
general description of the job market situation, as it more closely captures how the respondent views 
his or her own situation. 
13 One could argue that being married but not living together reduces the strength of the influence of 
the labour market status of the partner. However, there are very few observations with people being 
married but living apart. It is unlikely this will have any effect on the general results.  
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As presented above, the labour market status of the partner has previously been found to affect the 
decision to retire. Using SHARE data, we are able to distinguish not just between a working and a 
non-working partner, but can divide the variable for being married into five different sub-categories, 
depending on the labour market status of the partner. One such subcategory represents the presence of 
a partner who is working, and the other four represent different categories where the partner is not 
working; being unemployed, permanently sick or disabled, retired, or a homemaker.  
In the survey, respondents are asked about their highest level of education, a variable often creating 
difficulties in international comparisons as education is defined in different ways in different countries. 
Share uses ISCED-97-categories 14  to generate a standardised coding allowing us to make cross-
country comparisons. 15 These categories are then grouped into three broad categories; no or low 
education (corresponding to no more than compulsory education), high education (corresponding to 
studies at university) and medium education between these two categories.  
Another factor that has been found to be important but varies across countries is official retirement 
ages which are taken from  (Hospido & Zamarro, 2014). Including the retirement age has no logical 
interpretation per se, but can be used to calculate the “age-distance” to retirement. This distance to 
retirement is then divided into categories in order to make the specification as flexible as possible. We 
also include a variable for the number of hours worked per week.  (Rätzel, 2012) finds that hours of 
work and happiness in general exhibit an inversed U-shape relation, with a more pronounced curvature 
for men. This is interpreted as there being a positive effect from having work, but a negative effect of 
working more than the average working time. 
As health has been found to influence the retirement decision a number of health variables are 
included, both subjective (i.e. self-reported health status) and objective. The subjective health variable 
is the self-reported health status of the respondent, graded from 1 (excellent health) to 5 (poor health). 
Self-reported health is a widely used indicator of health, but there are several problems associated with 
it. For instance, it has been found to be affected by the wording in the questionnaire, especially when a 
survey is conducted in several different countries.  (Jürges, 2007). Furthermore, justification bias is a 
common worry. We measure health prior to retirement which will reduce this problem, but it will not 
be removed entirely as those who are planning to retire but have not yet done so may justify their 
internal decision by reporting worse health. 
In order to further reduce bias in health, we also include objective health measurements available in 
SHARE, such as a measure of grip strength, body mass index (BMI) classified into four different 
                                                     
14 1997 International Standard Classification of Education 
15 The exact descriptions of the country specific coding can be found in (SHARE, Release Guide 2.6.0 
Waves 1 & 2, 2013) 
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categories, whether or not the respondent feels limited in activities, whether the respondent is smoking 
or not, and results from a numeracy test.16 These variables do not necessarily reduce the working 
capacity in and on their own, but rather they are used as indicators used for bad or fragile health. We 
also include variables indicating whether or not the patient has received a diagnosis from a doctor, and 
whether this was for a severe condition or not.17  
Following  (Hamermesh, 1984), we include variables indicating whether or not the mother and/or 
father of the respondent is still alive, as instruments for life expectancy. If parents are still alive we 
expect the respondent to consider themselves more likely to live a long life.   
We also have access to the individuals’ expectations regarding the compensation rate of the future 
pension (i.e. what share of the current income will be covered by the future pension). This is not the 
same as the actual compensation rate, but an approximation made by the individual prior to retirement. 
As such, the approximation may be incorrect, but is none the less the a priori information available to 
the person and consequently the information that has more influence over retirement decisions than the 
actual replacement rate, as that information is simply not available until retirement is realised. In order 
to impose as few restrictions as possible on the effect of replacement rate we create binary dummy 
variables for different levels of the replacement rate. It should be noted that quite few have any 
perception of their future replacement rate. Of all individuals who are working in our data, only about 
50 percent of working respondents have any stated perception of their future replacement rate. We 
therefore use “replacement rate unknown” as a base or reference category. Replacement rates are 
registered on an individual basis. We also include a household income variable, indicating what 
income decile the household belongs to, on a national level. Income deciles consequently differ 
between countries and two otherwise identical households may be classified differently on income 
deciles if they are located in different countries.  
One important aspect is what kind of job the respondent has prior to retirement. We include a 
categorical variable defining 9 different groups of job types, corresponding to the one digit ISCO-
codes.18  
                                                     
16 There are several other objective health variables available in the SHARE data, but not all of them 
are suitable for the objectives of this paper. For instance, walking speed is only measured for 
individuals aged 76 or older  (SHARE, Release Guide 2.6.0 Waves 1 & 2, 2013) and consequently 
does not add much information for the individuals of most interest to us. 
17 Classification of diagnoses is based on that made by (Kalwij & Vermeulen, 2008) 
18 These codes use ten different groups, but we exclude those employed in the armed forces as these 
are very rare (a total of 23 observations) and most likely have very different conditions from the labour 
force in general.  
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In all regressions, country fixed effects will also be used in order to control for differences between 
countries apart from what is captured by the included control variables, such as the formal retirement 
age, income levels, etc.  
5 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
As a first query it might be interesting to see how the age at retirement varies in the data. In order to 
do this have to calculate the age at retirement for some observations as in waves 2 and 4 of the survey, 
we have self-reported information on when the respondent retired, given as the answer to the direct 
question ‘In what year did you retire?’. In the first wave of the survey this question was not included 
and we instead deduce the year of retirement by analysing answers given to questions regarding what 
year the respondent first received various pension benefits. The same procedure is possible in waves 2 
and 4 allowing us to analyse any possible differences in answers given to the two different questions. 
The differences are statistically significant but small. Age at retirement is then calculated as the 
maximum (latest) year or retirement, either by stated year or stated first year of receiving benefits, 
minus year of birth.  
Figure 1 - Mean age at retirement 
 
As can be seen from figure 1, the average age at retirement varies between countries, ranging from just 
over 55 years of age for women in Czechia to over 63 in Denmark.  
Information about individual, self-perceived, health is also available in the survey data. Respondents 
are asked about their health in general, and rank their health status on a scale from 1 to 5 where 1 
corresponds to very good health and 5 is interpreted as very poor health. Looking at the results for 
those aged 65 we can compare the self-perceived health between different waves of the survey.  
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The average level of self-reported health varies between waves of the survey. 19  As age is held 
constant this change in self-perceived health is not due to changes in age between waves. One possible 
explanation could be that this is due to changes in what is perceived as being good and poor health, but 
this is beyond the scope of this paper.  
In general, a substantial share of people approaching retirement age is married. A survey from the 
Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) shows that 78% of men aged 55-64 were married or living with 
a partner (Casanova, 2010). The corresponding share in the dataset used in this paper is just over 80%, 
although the share varies between waves. Just over half of respondents have a partner who is working 
and over 12% have a retired partner.  
The average age is just over 55 years of age, which means that the average person is approaching 
retirement age, but potentially still has some years left until retirement. Educational attainment is fairly 
evenly distributed between the three categories, with about 30% falling into each group.  
For more descriptive statistics, we refer to Table 2.  
6 RESULTS 
Results from our first specification are shown in the second column of Table 3. Age has an expected 
positive effect on retirement, with an expected negative effect of the quadratic term. However, life 
expectancy, as instrumented by whether or not parents are alive, does not seem to have any significant 
effect. Although parents do not seem to have any effect, the presence of children and grandchildren do. 
Having children reduces the probability of retirement whereas grandchildren have the opposite effect, 
which could either be due to demand for help in the care of grandchildren or because grandparents 
enjoy spending time with their grandchildren.  
Educational attainment does not appear to affect the retirement decision. However, hours of work does 
have an effect, where working more than the standard hours reduces the probability of retirement, 
which may indicate a closer attachment to work among individuals working long hours. There is also a 
weakly significant negative effect from working very few hours, which might be due to the lesser need 
for full retirement when working hours are very low.  
Results also show that the effect of having a partner depends on their labour market status. The 
reference category for marital status is “Never married”. The estimated effect of having a partner is 
                                                     
19 The difference is statistically significant. T-tests return t-values of -5.71 (waves 1 and 2), 2.23 
(waves 2 and 4) and -3.44 (waves 1 and 4) for difference in average health level between waves.  
Differences are greater if analysed for all ages. 
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positive, irrespective of the labour market status of the partner. However, having a partner who is 
retired or a home maker is highly significant, whereas other categories are only weakly significant. 
TABLE 2 DESCRIPITIVE STATISTICS 
 Observations included in the 
first specification 
Observations included in the 
second specification 
 Mean Mean 
VARIABLES (sd) (sd) 
   
Enters retirement2 0.180 0.168 
 (0.384) (0.374) 
Age 55.52 55.01 
 (4.749) (4.725) 
Male2 0.505 0.501 
 (0.500) (0.500) 
Foreign born2 0.0657 0.0654 
 (0.248) (0.247) 
Mother alive2 0.481 0.490 
 (0.500) (0.500) 
Father alive2 0.223 0.240 
 (0.417) (0.427) 
Number of children 2.299 2.317 
 (1.022) (1.035) 
Number of grandchildren 1.147 1.157 
 (1.804) (1.810) 
Hours worked per week 37.95 37.97 
 (13.66) (13.72) 
Low education2 0.302 0.293 
 (0.459) (0.455) 
Medium education2 0.383 0.391 
 (0.486) (0.488) 
High education2 0.315 0.316 
 (0.465) (0.465) 
Self-rated Health = Very good2 0.165 0.167 
 (0.371) (0.373) 
Self-rated Health = Good2 0.310 0.313 
 (0.462) (0.464) 
Self-rated Health = Fair2  0.398 0.389 
 (0.489) (0.488) 
Self-rated Health = Poor2 0.112 0.114 
 (0.316) (0.318) 
Self-rated Health = Very poor2 0.0155 0.0168 
 (0.123) (0.129) 
Currently smokes 0.2693 0.2693 
 (0.4436) (0.444) 
Used to smoke but stopped2 0.302 0.301 
 (0.459) (0.459) 
Never smoked2 0.429 0.430 
 (0.495) (0.495) 
Body Mass Index 26.17 26.075 
 (4.165) (4.088) 
Received a light diagnosis2 0.545 0.564 
 (0.498) (0.496) 
Received a severe diagnosis2 0.0328 0.0443 
 (0.178) (0.206) 
Absolute value of grip strength difference 4.655 4.660 
 (3.948) (3.996) 
Result on numeracy test 3.830 3.805 
 (0.977) (0.985) 
Never married 0.026 0.027 
 (0.159) (0.163) 
Married: Partner is working2 0.521 0.529 
 (0.500) (0.499) 
Married: Partner is retired2 0.129 0.123 
15 
 
 (0.335) (0.328) 
Married: Partner is unemployed2 0.0305 0.0315 
 (0.172) (0.175) 
Married: Partner is permanently sick or disabled2 0.0272 0.0296 
 (0.163) (0.169) 
Married: Partner is a home maker2 0.108 0.101 
 (0.310) (0.301) 
Divorced2 0.113 0.116 
 (0.317) (0.320) 
Widowed2 0.0455 0.0432 
 (0.208) (0.203) 
  (0.312) 
Number of years to formal retirement age  -9.065 
  (4.590) 
Jobtype: "Unknown or irrelevant"  0.00850 
  (0.0918) 
Jobtype: “Legislator, senior official or manager”   0.116 
  (0.320) 
Jobtype: “Professional”  0.169 
  (0.375) 
Jobtype: "Technician or associate professional"  0.152 
  (0.359) 
Jobtype: "Clerk"  0.145 
  (0.352) 
Jobtype: "Service worker or sales worker"  0.141 
  (0.348) 
Jobtype: "Skilled agri. or fishery worker"  0.0356 
  (0.185) 
Jobtype: "Craft and related"  0.0893 
  (0.285) 
Jobtype: "Plant and machine operator or assembler"  0.0576 
  (0.233) 
Jobtype: "Elementary occupation"  0.0852 
  (0.279) 
Expected replacement rate when retiring1  0.762 
  (0.386) 
# Observations 8,203 5,645 
1 Among those reporting an expected replacement rate 
It can also be interesting to see whether results differ between male and female respondents. We 
therefore divide the sample into male and female respondents. The results can be found in columns 
three (men) and four (women) of Table 3.  
Interestingly, the effect of having a partner is only significant for both sexes when the partner is retired. 
For men, the presence of a home making partner is also weakly significant.  
In our second specification we add more variables closely related to the retirement decision. We add 
variables for relative income and the expected replacement rate, as well as the type of job the 
respondent has, and the number of years above or below the official retirement age. Results are shown 
in Table 4. In column two of Table 4 we show the results for the full sample of both men and women.  
We find that relative income does not have any statistically significant effect, apart from the very 
lowest income decile, where the negative effect is significant. Expected replacement rate at retirement 
on the other hand is statistically significant. As about half of all respondents report not knowing their 
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expected replacement rate, but expecting a replacement rate of 75% or more of the current income 
increases the probability of retirement.  
When these additional variables have been added age is no longer statistically significant, but the 
distance to retirement is. It therefore appears that it is not the age of the respondent per se that 
influences the retirement decision, but rather the distance to the formal retirement age implied by 
age.20 We also find differences between different types of jobs. In Table 4 the baseline is a worker 
with elementary occupation. As expected, most other occupations are less likely retire, ceteris paribus. 
Exceptions are jobs that are generally physically demanding.   
 
TABLE 3: RESULTS FROM THE FIRST SPECIFICATION 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Full sample Men Women 
    
Age 0.1972*** 0.2381*** 0.1706*** 
 (0.023) (0.027) (0.035) 
Age squared -0.0014*** -0.0017*** -0.0012*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Male -0.0057 - - 
 (0.009)   
Foreign born -0.0401*** -0.0649*** -0.0231 
 (0.014) (0.025) (0.017) 
Mother alive  -0.0084 -0.0137 -0.0068 
 (0.008) (0.011) (0.010) 
Father alive -0.0003 -0.0107 0.0085 
 (0.011) (0.017) (0.014) 
Number of children -0.0126*** -0.0103* -0.0124** 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) 
Number of grandchildren 0.0047** 0.0051 0.0039 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Low education -0.0024 -0.0204 0.0202 
 (0.009) (0.014) (0.013) 
Medium education Ref Ref Ref 
    
High education -0.0141 -0.0361*** 0.0057 
 (0.009) (0.013) (0.013) 
Works 0-10 hours per week -0.0360* -0.0032 -0.0278 
 (0.022) (0.042) (0.024) 
Works 11-20 hours per week -0.0198 -0.0235 0.0001 
 (0.013) (0.027) (0.015) 
Works 21-30 hours per week -0.0022 -0.0115 0.0097 
 (0.012) (0.022) (0.014) 
Works 41-50 hours per week -0.0208** -0.0286** -0.0058 
 (0.009) (0.012) (0.015) 
Works more than 50 hours per week -0.0816*** -0.1027*** -0.0387 
 (0.014) (0.018) (0.024) 
                                                     
20 Further inspection reveals that it is indeed the inclusion of the variables for distance to retirement 
that remove the statistical significance of age. A full specification, as presented in table 4, but with 
only distance to retirement, returns results where age and age squared are statistically significant. 
Results available upon request.   
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Never married Ref Ref Ref 
    
Partner is working 0.0507* 0.0726 0.0357 
 (0.027) (0.053) (0.029) 
Partner is retired 0.0773*** 0.1001* 0.0667** 
 (0.027) (0.055) (0.030) 
Partner is unemployed 0.0556* 0.0920 0.0217 
 (0.033) (0.059) (0.043) 
Partner is sick or disabled 0.0557* 0.0777 0.0308 
 (0.033) (0.059) (0.041) 
Partner is a home maker 0.0785*** 0.0969* -0.0223 
 (0.029) (0.054) (0.091) 
Divorced 0.0323 0.0402 0.0250 
 (0.028) (0.055) (0.031) 
Widowed 0.0589** 0.0977* 0.0367 
 (0.030) (0.059) (0.033) 
    
Observations 8,183 4,133 4,050 
Pseudo R2 0.3095 0.3203 0.3164 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
all specifications include control variables for country, 
wave and individual health, measured both objectively and subjectively  
 
Again dividing the sample into men and women reveals that effects differ between the sexes, see 
columns 3 and 4 in Table 4, respectively. Again, the estimated marginal effects for partner’s labour 
market status are all insignificant for men and only having a retired partner has any statistically 
significant effect on retirement for women, which is in line with results in (Hospido & Zamarro, 2014), 
although the estimated effect we find is not as large as theirs.  
Relative income seems to be much more important for women facing a retirement decision than for 
men. This is also true for distance to formal retirement age, rather than actual age. Men, on the other 
hand, are more strongly influenced by actual age, and less so by ears to formal retirement age. 
TABLE 4: RESULTS FROM THE SECOND SPECIFICATION  
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Full sample Men Women 
    
Age 0.0137 0.1013** -0.0133 
 (0.042) (0.048) (0.074) 
Age squared 0.0002 -0.0005 0.0005 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Male -0.0219** - - 
 (0.010)   
Foreign born -0.0356** -0.0591** -0.0249 
 (0.016) (0.027) (0.020) 
Mother alive -0.0051 -0.0118 0.0011 
 (0.009) (0.013) (0.012) 
Father alive 0.0048 -0.0075 0.0155 
 (0.012) (0.018) (0.016) 
Number of children -0.0146*** -0.0151** -0.0135** 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) 
Number of grandchildren 0.0047* 0.0071* 0.0022 
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 (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) 
Low education 0.0047 -0.0025 0.0096 
 (0.011) (0.016) (0.015) 
Medium education Ref Ref Ref 
    
High education -0.0100 -0.0223 0.0031 
 (0.011) (0.015) (0.015) 
income_decile = 1 -0.0464* 0.0191 -0.0946*** 
 (0.024) (0.033) (0.034) 
income_decile = 2 -0.0174 0.0213 -0.0465 
 (0.027) (0.044) (0.033) 
income decile  = 3 Ref Ref Ref 
    
income_decile = 4 -0.0121 0.0572* -0.0700** 
 (0.024) (0.034) (0.032) 
income_decile = 5 -0.0295 0.0211 -0.0682** 
 (0.022) (0.031) (0.029) 
income_decile = 6 -0.0217 0.0529* -0.0798*** 
 (0.021) (0.029) (0.029) 
income_decile = 7 -0.0081 0.0530* -0.0505* 
 (0.021) (0.028) (0.030) 
income_decile = 8 -0.0123 0.0386 -0.0430 
 (0.021) (0.028) (0.029) 
income_decile = 9 0.0129 0.0793*** -0.0353 
 (0.021) (0.028) (0.029) 
income_decile = 10 -0.0088 0.0514* -0.0563* 
 (0.021) (0.029) (0.029) 
Expected replacement rate <50% -0.0333* -0.0152 -0.0417* 
 (0.017) (0.024) (0.024) 
Expected replacement rate 51-75% 0.0119 0.0115 0.0136 
 (0.011) (0.016) (0.014) 
Expected replacement rate 75-100% 0.0421*** 0.0376** 0.0401** 
 (0.012) (0.017) (0.016) 
Expected replacement rate >100% 0.0355*** 0.0450** 0.0207 
 (0.014) (0.019) (0.019) 
More than 10 years to retirement age 0.0556 0.0561 0.1764*** 
 (0.038) (0.063) (0.054) 
5-10 years to retirement age 0.0553* 0.0451 0.1186*** 
 (0.030) (0.047) (0.044) 
1-4 years to retirement age 0.0816*** 0.0808** 0.1073*** 
 (0.024) (0.035) (0.036) 
0-4 years above retirement age Ref Ref Ref 
    
5-10 years above retirement age -0.2169*** -0.1250* -0.2579*** 
 (0.058) (0.074) (0.098) 
10 or more years above retirement age -0.6204*** -0.2621  
 (0.180) (0.219)  
Jobtype: "Unknown or irrelevant" 0.0810* 0.1152** -0.0210 
 (0.049) (0.057) (0.086) 
Jobtype: “Legislator, senior official or manager” 0.0184 0.0216 0.0068 
 (0.017) (0.024) (0.025) 
Jobtype: “Professional” 0.0180 0.0024 0.0212 
 (0.016) (0.025) (0.021) 
Jobtype: "Technician or associate professional" 0.0285* 0.0231 0.0196 
 (0.015) (0.023) (0.020) 
Jobtype:  "Clerk" 0.0189 0.0299 0.0138 
 (0.014) (0.028) (0.016) 
Jobtype: "Service worker or sales worker" Ref Ref Ref 
    
jobtype = "Skilled agri. or fishery worker" 0.0755*** 0.0397 0.0919*** 
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 (0.026) (0.039) (0.033) 
jobtype = "Craft and related" 0.0353** 0.0185 0.0842** 
 (0.017) (0.024) (0.036) 
jobtype = "Plant and machine operator or assembler" 0.0657*** 0.0476* 0.1303*** 
 (0.021) (0.027) (0.048) 
jobtype = "Elementary occupation" 0.0075 0.0306 -0.0078 
 (0.016) (0.028) (0.019) 
Works 0-10 hours per week -0.0213 0.0102 -0.0158 
 (0.024) (0.045) (0.027) 
Works 11-20 hours per week -0.0118 -0.0399 0.0146 
 (0.016) (0.032) (0.018) 
Works 21-30 hours per week 0.0075 -0.0128 0.0257 
 (0.013) (0.025) (0.016) 
Works 41-50 hours per week -0.0197* -0.0358** -0.0010 
 (0.010) (0.014) (0.015) 
Works more than 50 hours per week -0.0684*** -0.0841*** -0.0375 
 (0.016) (0.021) (0.028) 
Never married Ref Ref Ref 
    
Partner is working 0.0417 0.0487 0.0350 
 (0.034) (0.073) (0.034) 
Partner is retired 0.0691** 0.0774 0.0666* 
 (0.034) (0.074) (0.034) 
Partner is unemployed 0.0645 0.0710 0.0519 
 (0.040) (0.079) (0.044) 
Partner is sick or disabled 0.0581 0.0614 0.0453 
 (0.039) (0.079) (0.045) 
Partner is a home maker 0.0689* 0.0683 0.0477 
 (0.037) (0.074) (0.127) 
Divorced 0.0291 0.0236 0.0337 
 (0.035) (0.075) (0.035) 
Widowed 0.0547 0.0754 0.0395 
 (0.037) (0.079) (0.038) 
    
Observations 5,645 2,828 2,815 
Pseudo R2 0.3710 0.3938 0.3826 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
all specifications include control variables for country, 
wave, and individual health, measured both objectively and subjectively 
  
6.1 ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
So far, retirement has been defined as going from employment to retirement. However, one could also 
use a broader definition, whereby we look at all transitions from non-retirement, including all different 
activities other than being retired, into retirement. Results from regressions with such a definition are 
shown in Table A3, where there are now no statistically significant effects from partner’s labour 
market status.  
An even broader definition would be to analyse the transition from work into any other activity, 
including but not restricted to retirement. As can be seen in Table A4, results are very similar to those 
presented in Table A3.  
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Although the panel in the SHARE survey is short and far from balanced we estimate a logit model 
with random effects to utilise what panel effects there might be. Results, shown in table A5, are very 
similar to those in our original specification.  
One might argue that once you reach a certain age retirement is no longer voluntary but forced upon 
you. We therefore run our regression also for a reduced sample where everyone is below the standard 
retirement age. For these respondents, retirement is at least to a higher degree voluntary. Results are 
shown in Table A6, and again our results are robust. 
In our last specification we include a dummy variable indicating whether respondent answered “yes” 
to the question about whether or not they are looking for early retirement from their current job. As 
can be seen in Table A7, the estimated effect of this variable is positive, quite large and highly 
significant. However, the inclusion of this variable does not change the estimated effect of partner’s 
labour market status.  
7 CONCLUSIONS 
Previous research has found that the labour market attachment of a partner has an effect on individual 
retirement behaviour. However, results have been mixed and clear conclusions are therefore difficult 
to reach. Commonly, the labour market status of the partner has been treated as only a binary variable, 
working or not working. However, it seems logical if the decision to retire, a long term decision, were 
affected in different ways from knowing that your partner will also be at home in the long term 
compared to being home temporarily. We are able to separate the labour market status of the partner 
into five separate categories instead of two, displaying that here is substantial disparity in the effects of 
a non-working partner. The presence of a partner who is unemployed or sick or disabled has no effect 
on retirement decision, but if the partner is retired or a homemaker the probability of retirement 
increases. These results indicate that potential retirees do consider whether their partner will be home 
permanently of not. However, dividing the sample into men and women, a different picture emerges. 
We now see that the effects on retirement probability differ between men and women. Of the effects 
from partner’s labour market status, only one remains; that of partner being retired, and this effect is 
found only among women. This shows the importance of analysing retirement behaviour separately 
for men and women, in order to be able to draw correct conclusions.  
As we add more explanatory variables some results change, but the effect of partners labour market 
status remains. For instance, once we control for number of years from the formal retirement age, the 
age variables are no longer statistically significant. This shows that it is not the age in years that 
matters to retirement, but rather how one perceives one’s own age relative to the formal retirement age 
of the country you live in. We do find that expected replacement rate of retirement benefits to current 
income has a statistically significant effect, whereas relative income has less of an effect.   
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APPENDIX 
TABLE A1: full results from first specification 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Full sample Men Women 
    
Age 0.1972*** 0.2381*** 0.1706*** 
 (0.023) (0.027) (0.035) 
Age squared -0.0014*** -0.0017*** -0.0012*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Male -0.0057   
 (0.009)   
Foreign born -0.0401*** -0.0649*** -0.0231 
 (0.014) (0.025) (0.017) 
Number of children -0.0126*** -0.0103* -0.0124** 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) 
Number of grandchildren 0.0047** 0.0051 0.0039 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Mother alive -0.0084 -0.0137 -0.0068 
 (0.008) (0.011) (0.010) 
Father alive -0.0003 -0.0107 0.0085 
 (0.011) (0.017) (0.014) 
Works 0-10 hours per week -0.0360* -0.0032 -0.0278 
 (0.022) (0.042) (0.024) 
Works 11-20 hours per week -0.0198 -0.0235 0.0001 
 (0.013) (0.027) (0.015) 
Works 21-30 hours per week -0.0022 -0.0115 0.0097 
 (0.012) (0.022) (0.014) 
Works 41-50 hours per week -0.0208** -0.0286** -0.0058 
 (0.009) (0.012) (0.015) 
Works more than 50 hours per week -0.0816*** -0.1027*** -0.0387 
 (0.014) (0.018) (0.024) 
wave = 2 0.0498*** 0.0546*** 0.0475*** 
 (0.008) (0.011) (0.010) 
Low education -0.0024 -0.0204 0.0202 
 (0.009) (0.014) (0.013) 
High education -0.0141 -0.0361*** 0.0057 
 (0.009) (0.013) (0.013) 
Self-rated Health = 1 -0.0104 -0.0173 -0.0033 
 (0.011) (0.016) (0.015) 
Self-rated Health = 2 -0.0045 -0.0068 -0.0022 
 (0.009) (0.013) (0.012) 
Self-rated Health = 4 0.0087 -0.0112 0.0287* 
 (0.012) (0.017) (0.017) 
Self-rated Health = 5 -0.0301 -0.0626* 0.0093 
 (0.028) (0.037) (0.040) 
Never smoked 0.0047 0.0168 -0.0008 
 (0.010) (0.014) (0.013) 
Used to smoke but stopped 0.0056 0.0109 -0.0003 
 (0.010) (0.013) (0.015) 
Low weight (BMI 18.5 or less) -0.0137 -0.0281 -0.0155 
 (0.036) (0.066) (0.042) 
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Overweight (BMI between 25 and 29.9) 0.0039 0.0137 -0.0084 
 (0.008) (0.012) (0.011) 
Obese (BMI 30 or more) 0.0070 0.0174 -0.0094 
 (0.011) (0.017) (0.014) 
Received a light diagnosis 0.0172** 0.0217* 0.0159 
 (0.008) (0.011) (0.010) 
Received a severe diagnosis -0.0557** -0.0441 -0.0581* 
 (0.024) (0.034) (0.033) 
absolute value of grip strength difference -0.0001 -0.0003 0.0007 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Result on numeracy test 0.0022 -0.0097 0.0133** 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) 
country identifier = 12, Germany -0.1604*** -0.1376*** -0.1884*** 
 (0.032) (0.043) (0.047) 
country identifier = 13, Sweden -0.1898*** -0.1792*** -0.2104*** 
 (0.031) (0.042) (0.046) 
country identifier = 14, Netherlands -0.1624*** -0.1241*** -0.2078*** 
 (0.032) (0.044) (0.047) 
country identifier = 15, Spain -0.1752*** -0.1390*** -0.2425*** 
 (0.034) (0.045) (0.053) 
country identifier = 16, Italy -0.1041*** -0.0924* -0.1233** 
 (0.035) (0.048) (0.051) 
country identifier = 17, France -0.0600* 0.0181 -0.1235*** 
 (0.032) (0.045) (0.047) 
country identifier = 18, Denmark -0.1632*** -0.1627*** -0.1726*** 
 (0.032) (0.043) (0.047) 
country identifier = 19, Greece -0.2904*** -0.2888*** -0.2899*** 
 (0.031) (0.041) (0.047) 
country identifier = 20, Switzerland -0.1863*** -0.1611*** -0.2174*** 
 (0.033) (0.045) (0.048) 
country identifier = 21, 21 0.0697* 0.0780 0.0556 
 (0.036) (0.050) (0.052) 
country identifier = 22, 22 0.0745* -0.0011 0.1494** 
 (0.044) (0.057) (0.061) 
country identifier = 23, Belgium -0.0940*** -0.0552 -0.1384*** 
 (0.032) (0.044) (0.048) 
Partner is working 0.0507* 0.0726 0.0357 
 (0.027) (0.053) (0.029) 
Partner is retired 0.0773*** 0.1001* 0.0667** 
 (0.027) (0.055) (0.030) 
Partner is unemployed 0.0556* 0.0920 0.0217 
 (0.033) (0.059) (0.043) 
Partner is sick or disabled 0.0557* 0.0777 0.0308 
 (0.033) (0.059) (0.041) 
Partner is a home maker 0.0785*** 0.0969* -0.0223 
 (0.029) (0.054) (0.091) 
Divorced 0.0323 0.0402 0.0250 
 (0.028) (0.055) (0.031) 
Widowed 0.0589** 0.0977* 0.0367 
 (0.030) (0.059) (0.033) 
    
Observations 8,183 4,133 4,050 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE A2: full results from second specification 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Full sample Men Women 
    
Age 0.0137 0.1013** -0.0133 
 (0.042) (0.048) (0.074) 
Age squared 0.0002 -0.0005 0.0005 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Male -0.0219**   
 (0.010)   
Foreign born -0.0356** -0.0591** -0.0249 
 (0.016) (0.027) (0.020) 
Number of children -0.0146*** -0.0151** -0.0135** 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) 
Number of grandchildren 0.0047* 0.0071* 0.0022 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) 
Mother alive -0.0051 -0.0118 0.0011 
 (0.009) (0.013) (0.012) 
Father alive 0.0048 -0.0075 0.0155 
 (0.012) (0.018) (0.016) 
Works 0-10 hours per week -0.0213 0.0102 -0.0158 
 (0.024) (0.045) (0.027) 
Works 11-20 hours per week -0.0118 -0.0399 0.0146 
 (0.016) (0.032) (0.018) 
Works 21-30 hours per week 0.0075 -0.0128 0.0257 
 (0.013) (0.025) (0.016) 
Works 41-50 hours per week -0.0197* -0.0358** -0.0010 
 (0.010) (0.014) (0.015) 
Works more than 50 hours per week -0.0684*** -0.0841*** -0.0375 
 (0.016) (0.021) (0.028) 
wave = 2 0.0755*** 0.0865*** 0.0588*** 
 (0.010) (0.015) (0.014) 
Low education 0.0047 -0.0025 0.0096 
 (0.011) (0.016) (0.015) 
High education -0.0100 -0.0223 0.0031 
 (0.011) (0.015) (0.015) 
income_decile = 1 -0.0464* 0.0191 -0.0946*** 
 (0.024) (0.033) (0.034) 
income_decile = 2 -0.0174 0.0213 -0.0465 
  (0.027) (0.044) (0.033) 
income_decile = 4 -0.0121 0.0572* -0.0700** 
 (0.024) (0.034) (0.032) 
income_decile = 5 -0.0295 0.0211 -0.0682** 
 (0.022) (0.031) (0.029) 
income_decile = 6 -0.0217 0.0529* -0.0798*** 
 (0.021) (0.029) (0.029) 
income_decile = 7 -0.0081 0.0530* -0.0505* 
 (0.021) (0.028) (0.030) 
income_decile = 8 -0.0123 0.0386 -0.0430 
 (0.021) (0.028) (0.029) 
income_decile = 9 0.0129 0.0793*** -0.0353 
 (0.021) (0.028) (0.029) 
income_decile = 10 -0.0088 0.0514* -0.0563* 
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 (0.021) (0.029) (0.029) 
Expected replacement rate <50% -0.0333* -0.0152 -0.0417* 
 (0.017) (0.024) (0.024) 
Expected replacement rate 51-75% 0.0119 0.0115 0.0136 
 (0.011) (0.016) (0.014) 
Expected replacement rate 75-100% 0.0421*** 0.0376** 0.0401** 
 (0.012) (0.017) (0.016) 
Expected replacement rate >100% 0.0355*** 0.0450** 0.0207 
 (0.014) (0.019) (0.019) 
More than 10 years to retirement age 0.0556 0.0561 0.1764*** 
 (0.038) (0.063) (0.054) 
5-10 years to retirement age 0.0553* 0.0451 0.1186*** 
 (0.030) (0.047) (0.044) 
1-4 years to retirement age 0.0816*** 0.0808** 0.1073*** 
 (0.024) (0.035) (0.036) 
5-10 years above retirement age -0.2169*** -0.1250* -0.2579*** 
 (0.058) (0.074) (0.098) 
10 or more years above retirement age -0.6204*** -0.2621  
 (0.180) (0.219)  
jobtype = 0 0.0810* 0.1152** -0.0210 
 (0.049) (0.057) (0.086) 
jobtype = 1 0.0184 0.0216 0.0068 
 (0.017) (0.024) (0.025) 
jobtype = 2 0.0180 0.0024 0.0212 
 (0.016) (0.025) (0.021) 
jobtype = 3 0.0285* 0.0231 0.0196 
 (0.015) (0.023) (0.020) 
jobtype = 4 0.0189 0.0299 0.0138 
 (0.014) (0.028) (0.016) 
jobtype = 6 0.0755*** 0.0397 0.0919*** 
 (0.026) (0.039) (0.033) 
jobtype = 7 0.0353** 0.0185 0.0842** 
 (0.017) (0.024) (0.036) 
jobtype = 8 0.0657*** 0.0476* 0.1303*** 
 (0.021) (0.027) (0.048) 
jobtype = 9 0.0075 0.0306 -0.0078 
 (0.016) (0.028) (0.019) 
Self-rated Health = 1 -0.0250** -0.0286 -0.0222 
 (0.013) (0.018) (0.018) 
Self-rated Health = 2 -0.0213** -0.0199 -0.0187 
 (0.010) (0.014) (0.013) 
Self-rated Health = 4 0.0033 -0.0121 0.0195 
 (0.014) (0.021) (0.019) 
Self-rated Health = 5 -0.0022 -0.0484 0.0447 
 (0.027) (0.035) (0.037) 
Never smoked -0.0055 0.0055 -0.0067 
 (0.010) (0.015) (0.014) 
Used to smoke but stopped -0.0080 -0.0152 0.0016 
 (0.011) (0.015) (0.016) 
Low weight (BMI 18.5 or less) 0.0643* 0.1305** 0.0417 
 (0.033) (0.060) (0.035) 
Overweight (BMI between 25 and 29.9) 0.0110 0.0099 0.0090 
 (0.009) (0.013) (0.012) 
Obese (BMI 30 or more) 0.0085 0.0148 -0.0074 
 (0.012) (0.019) (0.016) 
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Received a light diagnosis 0.0084 0.0127 0.0064 
 (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) 
Received a severe diagnosis -0.0639*** -0.0585* -0.0494 
 (0.023) (0.033) (0.030) 
absolute value of grip strength difference 0.0005 0.0011 -0.0017 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Result on numeracy test 0.0021 -0.0074 0.0075 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) 
country identifier = 12, Germany -0.1511*** -0.1183** -0.2365*** 
 (0.033) (0.049) (0.049) 
country identifier = 13, Sweden -0.1994*** -0.1764*** -0.2686*** 
 (0.032) (0.049) (0.047) 
country identifier = 14, Netherlands -0.1596*** -0.1253** -0.2480*** 
 (0.034) (0.051) (0.050) 
country identifier = 15, Spain -0.1889*** -0.1623*** -0.2700*** 
 (0.037) (0.053) (0.057) 
country identifier = 16, Italy -0.1212*** -0.0769 -0.2084*** 
 (0.037) (0.056) (0.052) 
country identifier = 17, France -0.0814** 0.0076 -0.1596*** 
 (0.034) (0.058) (0.046) 
country identifier = 18, Denmark -0.1687*** -0.1594*** -0.2277*** 
 (0.033) (0.049) (0.049) 
country identifier = 19, Greece -0.2302*** -0.2093*** -0.2698*** 
 (0.035) (0.052) (0.060) 
country identifier = 20, Switzerland -0.1975*** -0.1670*** -0.2720*** 
 (0.034) (0.052) (0.048) 
country identifier = 21, 21 0.0017 0.0146 -0.0244 
 (0.038) (0.058) (0.055) 
country identifier = 22, 22 -0.0166 -0.0492 0.0402 
 (0.042) (0.058) (0.064) 
country identifier = 23, Belgium -0.1138*** -0.0756 -0.1997*** 
 (0.035) (0.051) (0.052) 
Partner is working 0.0417 0.0487 0.0350 
 (0.034) (0.073) (0.034) 
Partner is retired 0.0691** 0.0774 0.0666* 
 (0.034) (0.074) (0.034) 
Partner is unemployed 0.0645 0.0710 0.0519 
 (0.040) (0.079) (0.044) 
Partner is sick or disabled 0.0581 0.0614 0.0453 
 (0.039) (0.079) (0.045) 
Partner is a home maker 0.0689* 0.0683 0.0477 
 (0.037) (0.074) (0.127) 
Divorced 0.0291 0.0236 0.0337 
 (0.035) (0.075) (0.035) 
Widowed 0.0547 0.0754 0.0395 
 (0.037) (0.079) (0.038) 
    
Observations 5,645 2,828 2,815 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE A3: results using the wider definition of retirement 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Full sample Men Women 
    
Age 0.1172*** 0.1064** 0.1326*** 
 (0.022) (0.046) (0.028) 
Age squared -0.0007*** -0.0006 -0.0008*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Male -0.0108   
 (0.010)   
Foreign born -0.0238 -0.0493* -0.0113 
 (0.016) (0.026) (0.019) 
Number of children -0.0126*** -0.0140** -0.0095* 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) 
Number of grandchildren 0.0048** 0.0077** 0.0015 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) 
Mother alive -0.0004 -0.0110 0.0078 
 (0.009) (0.013) (0.012) 
Father alive 0.0023 -0.0111 0.0104 
 (0.012) (0.018) (0.016) 
Works 0-10 hours per week -0.0132 0.0297 0.0028 
 (0.020) (0.037) (0.022) 
Works 11-20 hours per week -0.0053 -0.0378 0.0189 
 (0.015) (0.030) (0.017) 
Works 21-30 hours per week 0.0115 -0.0147 0.0281* 
 (0.013) (0.025) (0.016) 
Works 41-50 hours per week -0.0203* -0.0367*** -0.0017 
 (0.010) (0.014) (0.016) 
Works more than 50 hours per week -0.0674*** -0.0817*** -0.0277 
 (0.017) (0.021) (0.029) 
wave = 2 0.0751*** 0.0872*** 0.0574*** 
 (0.010) (0.015) (0.014) 
Low education 0.0029 0.0004 0.0127 
 (0.011) (0.016) (0.014) 
High education -0.0122 -0.0208 0.0004 
 (0.011) (0.015) (0.015) 
income_decile = 1 -0.0162 0.0057 -0.0359 
 (0.021) (0.032) (0.026) 
income_decile = 2 -0.0214 -0.0093 -0.0264 
 (0.022) (0.043) (0.025) 
income_decile = 4 0.0003 0.0500 -0.0380 
 (0.021) (0.034) (0.025) 
income_decile = 5 -0.0259 0.0094 -0.0499** 
 (0.019) (0.030) (0.023) 
income_decile = 6 -0.0098 0.0485* -0.0542** 
 (0.019) (0.029) (0.023) 
income_decile = 7 0.0048 0.0388 -0.0144 
 (0.019) (0.028) (0.024) 
income_decile = 8 -0.0007 0.0301 -0.0194 
 (0.019) (0.028) (0.024) 
income_decile = 9 0.0234 0.0674** -0.0073 
 (0.019) (0.028) (0.024) 
income_decile = 10 0.0054 0.0410 -0.0238 
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 (0.019) (0.028) (0.025) 
Expected replacement rate <50% -0.0369** -0.0161 -0.0423* 
 (0.017) (0.025) (0.023) 
Expected replacement rate 51-75% 0.0101 0.0113 0.0139 
 (0.011) (0.016) (0.014) 
Expected replacement rate 75-100% 0.0473*** 0.0395** 0.0446*** 
 (0.012) (0.017) (0.016) 
Expected replacement rate >100% 0.0309** 0.0456** 0.0162 
 (0.013) (0.019) (0.018) 
More than 10 years to retirement age 0.0301 0.0562 0.1358** 
 (0.037) (0.062) (0.055) 
5-10 years to retirement age 0.0217 0.0380 0.0739** 
 (0.025) (0.046) (0.036) 
1-4 years to retirement age 0.0684*** 0.0771** 0.0820*** 
 (0.018) (0.034) (0.024) 
5-10 years above retirement age -0.1294*** -0.1537** -0.1159*** 
 (0.033) (0.077) (0.037) 
10 or more years above retirement age -0.2165*** -0.2535 -0.1990** 
 (0.074) (0.218) (0.078) 
jobtype = 0 -0.0757*** 0.0707 -0.1036*** 
 (0.022) (0.048) (0.025) 
jobtype = 1 0.0159 0.0186 0.0100 
 (0.017) (0.024) (0.027) 
jobtype = 2 0.0159 0.0000 0.0253 
 (0.017) (0.025) (0.023) 
jobtype = 3 0.0262* 0.0199 0.0248 
 (0.016) (0.023) (0.022) 
jobtype = 4 0.0190 0.0282 0.0167 
 (0.015) (0.029) (0.018) 
jobtype = 6 0.0703*** 0.0229 0.1012*** 
 (0.026) (0.039) (0.035) 
jobtype = 7 0.0332* 0.0207 0.0869** 
 (0.018) (0.024) (0.039) 
jobtype = 8 0.0598*** 0.0424 0.1534*** 
 (0.022) (0.026) (0.048) 
jobtype = 9 0.0103 0.0300 -0.0028 
 (0.017) (0.028) (0.021) 
Self-rated Health = 1 -0.0238* -0.0307* -0.0192 
 (0.012) (0.018) (0.016) 
Self-rated Health = 2 -0.0188** -0.0217 -0.0141 
 (0.009) (0.014) (0.012) 
Self-rated Health = 4 0.0014 -0.0189 0.0140 
 (0.013) (0.021) (0.015) 
Self-rated Health = 5 -0.0089 -0.0402 0.0124 
 (0.023) (0.031) (0.030) 
Never smoked -0.0107 0.0006 -0.0116 
 (0.010) (0.015) (0.013) 
Used to smoke but stopped -0.0087 -0.0123 -0.0063 
 (0.011) (0.015) (0.015) 
Low weight (BMI 18.5 or less) 0.0754** 0.1326** 0.0624* 
 (0.032) (0.062) (0.033) 
Overweight (BMI between 25 and 29.9) 0.0083 0.0142 0.0034 
 (0.009) (0.013) (0.011) 
Obese (BMI 30 or more) 0.0062 0.0184 -0.0085 
 (0.012) (0.018) (0.015) 
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Received a light diagnosis 0.0067 0.0143 0.0073 
 (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) 
Received a severe diagnosis -0.0448*** -0.0543* -0.0382* 
 (0.017) (0.029) (0.021) 
absolute value of grip strength difference 0.0007 0.0013 -0.0009 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Result on numeracy test 0.0002 -0.0059 0.0031 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) 
country identifier = 12, Germany -0.1448*** -0.1255*** -0.1988*** 
 (0.033) (0.047) (0.048) 
country identifier = 13, Sweden -0.1915*** -0.1822*** -0.2289*** 
 (0.032) (0.047) (0.046) 
country identifier = 14, Netherlands -0.1617*** -0.1346*** -0.2138*** 
 (0.033) (0.048) (0.048) 
country identifier = 15, Spain -0.1937*** -0.1699*** -0.2550*** 
 (0.036) (0.050) (0.053) 
country identifier = 16, Italy -0.1551*** -0.0938* -0.2008*** 
 (0.035) (0.053) (0.049) 
country identifier = 17, France -0.1015*** -0.0023 -0.1568*** 
 (0.033) (0.056) (0.044) 
country identifier = 18, Denmark -0.1610*** -0.1651*** -0.1863*** 
 (0.032) (0.047) (0.048) 
country identifier = 19, Greece -0.2134*** -0.2141*** -0.2274*** 
 (0.033) (0.049) (0.050) 
country identifier = 20, Switzerland -0.1919*** -0.1655*** -0.2400*** 
 (0.033) (0.050) (0.047) 
country identifier = 21, 21 0.0215 0.0135 0.0263 
 (0.038) (0.056) (0.054) 
country identifier = 22, 22 -0.0140 -0.0640 0.0872 
 (0.041) (0.056) (0.061) 
country identifier = 23, Belgium -0.1190*** -0.0847* -0.1789*** 
 (0.034) (0.049) (0.051) 
Partner is working 0.0445 0.0647 0.0361 
 (0.033) (0.071) (0.033) 
Partner is retired 0.0652* 0.0954 0.0602* 
 (0.033) (0.072) (0.034) 
Partner is unemployed 0.0559 0.0843 0.0356 
 (0.039) (0.078) (0.043) 
Partner is sick or disabled 0.0546 0.0773 0.0324 
 (0.039) (0.077) (0.045) 
Partner is a home maker 0.0788** 0.0846 0.0637 
 (0.035) (0.072) (0.116) 
Divorced 0.0301 0.0398 0.0291 
 (0.034) (0.074) (0.034) 
Widowed 0.0739** 0.1012 0.0663* 
 (0.035) (0.076) (0.035) 
    
Observations 6,533 2,923 3,610 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE A4: results using the widest definition of retirement 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Full sample Men Women 
    
Age -0.1666*** -0.1718*** -0.1846*** 
 (0.028) (0.055) (0.036) 
Age squared 0.0018*** 0.0018*** 0.0020*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Male -0.0375***   
 (0.014)   
Foreign born -0.0357 -0.0346 -0.0389 
 (0.023) (0.035) (0.031) 
Number of children -0.0096 -0.0168** -0.0034 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.010) 
Number of grandchildren 0.0110*** 0.0134*** 0.0077 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Mother alive 0.0026 -0.0111 0.0171 
 (0.012) (0.016) (0.017) 
Father alive -0.0315** -0.0475** -0.0116 
 (0.014) (0.021) (0.020) 
Works 0-10 hours per week 0.0756** -0.0147 0.1259*** 
 (0.032) (0.056) (0.039) 
Works 11-20 hours per week 0.0105 0.0127 0.0265 
 (0.021) (0.046) (0.026) 
Works 21-30 hours per week 0.0253 0.0181 0.0404* 
 (0.019) (0.039) (0.023) 
Works 41-50 hours per week -0.0306** -0.0315* -0.0397* 
 (0.014) (0.019) (0.023) 
Works more than 50 hours per week -0.0689*** -0.0841*** -0.0269 
 (0.022) (0.026) (0.039) 
wave = 2 0.1015*** 0.1261*** 0.0710*** 
 (0.014) (0.020) (0.019) 
Low education -0.0037 -0.0037 -0.0072 
 (0.015) (0.021) (0.021) 
High education -0.0183 -0.0065 -0.0236 
 (0.015) (0.021) (0.022) 
income_decile = 1 0.0016 0.0469 -0.0239 
 (0.038) (0.054) (0.053) 
income_decile = 2 0.0274 0.0707 -0.0077 
 (0.041) (0.065) (0.050) 
income_decile = 4 0.0021 0.0838 -0.0795* 
 (0.035) (0.053) (0.046) 
income_decile = 5 -0.0055 0.0690 -0.0631 
 (0.033) (0.048) (0.043) 
income_decile = 6 -0.0116 0.0390 -0.0598 
 (0.031) (0.045) (0.043) 
income_decile = 7 0.0158 0.0768* -0.0341 
 (0.031) (0.044) (0.043) 
income_decile = 8 -0.0086 0.0362 -0.0436 
 (0.031) (0.044) (0.042) 
income_decile = 9 0.0083 0.0629 -0.0374 
 (0.031) (0.044) (0.043) 
income_decile = 10 -0.0048 0.0504 -0.0545 
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 (0.031) (0.045) (0.043) 
Expected replacement rate <50% -0.0625*** -0.0483 -0.0707** 
 (0.023) (0.033) (0.034) 
Expected replacement rate 51-75% -0.0028 0.0057 -0.0144 
 (0.015) (0.021) (0.020) 
Expected replacement rate 75-100% 0.0164 0.0351 -0.0134 
 (0.017) (0.022) (0.025) 
Expected replacement rate >100% 0.0043 0.0169 -0.0183 
 (0.019) (0.026) (0.029) 
More than 10 years to retirement age 0.1000 0.1183 0.1768* 
 (0.061) (0.091) (0.091) 
5-10 years to retirement age 0.0985* 0.1130 0.1521** 
 (0.051) (0.074) (0.076) 
1-4 years to retirement age 0.1422*** 0.1779*** 0.1404** 
 (0.043) (0.058) (0.065) 
5-10 years above retirement age -0.3779*** -0.4614*** -0.2372 
 (0.115) (0.149) (0.198) 
10 or more years above retirement age = o, - - - 
    
jobtype = 0 0.0867 0.1320 0.0233 
 (0.064) (0.080) (0.099) 
jobtype = 1 0.0275 0.0432 0.0295 
 (0.024) (0.033) (0.038) 
jobtype = 2 0.0006 0.0126 -0.0019 
 (0.022) (0.033) (0.031) 
jobtype = 3 0.0402* 0.0993*** -0.0169 
 (0.021) (0.032) (0.028) 
jobtype = 4 0.0293 0.0652* 0.0228 
 (0.021) (0.037) (0.025) 
jobtype = 6 0.0518 0.0582 0.0493 
 (0.033) (0.044) (0.050) 
jobtype = 7 0.0787*** 0.1030*** 0.1367** 
 (0.025) (0.032) (0.055) 
jobtype = 8 0.1018*** 0.1246*** 0.1555*** 
 (0.028) (0.035) (0.058) 
jobtype = 9 0.0291 0.0901** -0.0054 
 (0.024) (0.041) (0.030) 
Self-rated Health = 1 -0.0632*** -0.0802*** -0.0326 
 (0.017) (0.024) (0.025) 
Self-rated Health = 2 -0.0536*** -0.0741*** -0.0193 
 (0.013) (0.019) (0.019) 
Self-rated Health = 4 0.0466** 0.0131 0.0811*** 
 (0.020) (0.028) (0.028) 
Self-rated Health = 5 0.1496*** 0.0774 0.2393*** 
 (0.046) (0.063) (0.070) 
Never smoked -0.0110 -0.0171 -0.0085 
 (0.014) (0.019) (0.020) 
Used to smoke but stopped -0.0184 -0.0309 -0.0118 
 (0.015) (0.020) (0.022) 
Low weight (BMI 18.5 or less) 0.0882 0.3069* 0.0675 
 (0.059) (0.186) (0.063) 
Overweight (BMI between 25 and 29.9) 0.0092 -0.0111 0.0329* 
 (0.012) (0.017) (0.017) 
Obese (BMI 30 or more) 0.0263 0.0452* -0.0030 
 (0.017) (0.024) (0.023) 
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Received a light diagnosis -0.0075 -0.0124 -0.0005 
 (0.012) (0.017) (0.017) 
Received a severe diagnosis -0.0490* -0.0095 -0.0806* 
 (0.029) (0.038) (0.043) 
absolute value of grip strength difference 0.0006 0.0029* -0.0039 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) 
Result on numeracy test 0.0004 0.0055 -0.0069 
 (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) 
country identifier = 12, Germany -0.1556*** -0.1387** -0.2052*** 
 (0.040) (0.054) (0.061) 
country identifier = 13, Sweden -0.2075*** -0.1704*** -0.2634*** 
 (0.039) (0.053) (0.058) 
country identifier = 14, Netherlands -0.1014** -0.0472 -0.1943*** 
 (0.041) (0.055) (0.062) 
country identifier = 15, Spain -0.1291*** -0.1419** -0.1055 
 (0.048) (0.062) (0.074) 
country identifier = 16, Italy -0.1712*** -0.1280** -0.2227*** 
 (0.042) (0.057) (0.062) 
country identifier = 17, France -0.0832** 0.0154 -0.1571*** 
 (0.040) (0.062) (0.055) 
country identifier = 18, Denmark -0.1896*** -0.1573*** -0.2374*** 
 (0.039) (0.053) (0.060) 
country identifier = 19, Greece -0.2964*** -0.2763*** -0.2879*** 
 (0.041) (0.054) (0.064) 
country identifier = 20, Switzerland -0.2523*** -0.2354*** -0.2896*** 
 (0.042) (0.057) (0.062) 
country identifier = 21, 21 -0.0961** -0.0659 -0.1227* 
 (0.044) (0.063) (0.063) 
country identifier = 22, 22 -0.0586 -0.0644 -0.0203 
 (0.049) (0.067) (0.071) 
country identifier = 23, Belgium -0.1349*** -0.0818 -0.2127*** 
 (0.039) (0.053) (0.059) 
Partner is working -0.0045 -0.0578 0.0160 
 (0.036) (0.061) (0.045) 
Partner is retired 0.0310 -0.0138 0.0501 
 (0.038) (0.068) (0.046) 
Partner is unemployed 0.0547 -0.0103 0.0783 
 (0.045) (0.073) (0.061) 
Partner is sick or disabled 0.0295 -0.0252 0.0380 
 (0.047) (0.074) (0.063) 
Partner is a home maker 0.0380 -0.0008 0.2298* 
 (0.040) (0.065) (0.125) 
Divorced -0.0226 -0.0657 -0.0041 
 (0.038) (0.067) (0.046) 
Widowed -0.0311 -0.0364 -0.0502 
 (0.042) (0.076) (0.051) 
    
Observations 5,640 2,825 2,815 
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TABLE A5: results using panel logit 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Full sample Men Women 
Age 0.1564 1.1254* -0.1679 
 (0.340) (0.587) (0.511) 
Age squared 0.0023 -0.0059 0.0061 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) 
Male -0.2500**   
 (0.117)   
Foreign born -0.4063** -0.6560** -0.3136 
 (0.198) (0.304) (0.274) 
Number of children -0.1669*** -0.1682** -0.1707** 
 (0.052) (0.073) (0.079) 
Number of grandchildren 0.0537* 0.0787** 0.0277 
 (0.028) (0.039) (0.041) 
Mother alive -0.0584 -0.1307 0.0137 
 (0.100) (0.143) (0.151) 
Father alive 0.0554 -0.0832 0.1948 
 (0.137) (0.202) (0.198) 
Works 0-10 hours per week -0.2436 0.1137 -0.1992 
 (0.250) (0.423) (0.339) 
Works 11-20 hours per week -0.1353 -0.4431 0.1841 
 (0.176) (0.357) (0.225) 
Works 21-30 hours per week 0.0862 -0.1425 0.3232 
 (0.155) (0.283) (0.200) 
Works 41-50 hours per week -0.2256* -0.3973** -0.0130 
 (0.123) (0.162) (0.204) 
Works more than 50 hours per week -0.7817*** -0.9337*** -0.4720 
 (0.187) (0.232) (0.357) 
wave = 2 0.8314*** 0.9158*** 0.7199*** 
 (0.110) (0.154) (0.167) 
Low education 0.0536 -0.0278 0.1209 
 (0.124) (0.178) (0.189) 
High education -0.1144 -0.2471 0.0390 
 (0.129) (0.181) (0.197) 
income_decile = 1 -0.5618* 0.2458 -1.1846*** 
 (0.310) (0.467) (0.453) 
income_decile = 2 -0.1986 0.2734 -0.5228 
 (0.314) (0.540) (0.408) 
income_decile = 4 -0.1369 0.6853 -0.8260** 
 (0.270) (0.427) (0.376) 
income_decile = 5 -0.3437 0.2702 -0.8019** 
 (0.253) (0.402) (0.353) 
income_decile = 6 -0.2498 0.6392* -0.9641*** 
 (0.245) (0.382) (0.350) 
income_decile = 7 -0.0901 0.6400* -0.5723* 
 (0.238) (0.377) (0.336) 
income_decile = 8 -0.1383 0.4787 -0.4811 
 (0.237) (0.374) (0.332) 
income_decile = 9 0.1390 0.9174** -0.3897 
 (0.235) (0.373) (0.334) 
income_decile = 10 -0.0981 0.6223 -0.6462* 
 (0.240) (0.380) (0.337) 
Expected replacement rate <50% -0.3810** -0.1684 -0.5256* 
 (0.194) (0.271) (0.295) 
Expected replacement rate 51-75% 0.1359 0.1275 0.1710 
 (0.122) (0.177) (0.178) 
Expected replacement rate 75-100% 0.4814*** 0.4174** 0.5051** 
 (0.137) (0.189) (0.215) 
36 
 
Expected replacement rate >100% 0.4052** 0.5002** 0.2603 
 (0.158) (0.214) (0.250) 
More than 10 years to retirement age 0.6354 0.6229 2.2218*** 
 (0.437) (0.689) (0.697) 
5-10 years to retirement age 0.6320* 0.5005 1.4936*** 
 (0.331) (0.506) (0.523) 
1-4 years to retirement age 0.9327*** 0.8973** 1.3516*** 
 (0.258) (0.376) (0.408) 
5-10 years above retirement age -2.4790*** -1.3882 -3.2490*** 
 (0.607) (0.918) (0.946) 
10 or more years above retirement age -7.0897*** -2.9105  
 (1.556) (2.087)  
jobtype = 0 0.8773* 1.1683* -0.3018 
 (0.498) (0.612) (1.161) 
jobtype = 1 0.2225 0.2485 0.0905 
 (0.202) (0.285) (0.328) 
jobtype = 2 0.2169 0.0291 0.2733 
 (0.192) (0.295) (0.274) 
jobtype = 3 0.3373* 0.2655 0.2534 
 (0.180) (0.270) (0.260) 
jobtype = 4 0.2274 0.3393 0.1811 
 (0.179) (0.313) (0.228) 
jobtype = 6 0.8243*** 0.4441 1.0384*** 
 (0.264) (0.402) (0.378) 
jobtype = 7 0.4122** 0.2144 0.9635** 
 (0.202) (0.274) (0.408) 
jobtype = 8 0.7279*** 0.5264* 1.3941*** 
 (0.226) (0.301) (0.436) 
jobtype = 9 0.0926 0.3471 -0.1076 
 (0.205) (0.328) (0.282) 
Self-rated Health = 1 -0.2892* -0.3189 -0.2860 
 (0.150) (0.210) (0.229) 
Self-rated Health = 2 -0.2445** -0.2189 -0.2393 
 (0.115) (0.158) (0.179) 
Self-rated Health = 4 0.0358 -0.1311 0.2305 
 (0.147) (0.217) (0.215) 
Self-rated Health = 5 -0.0246 -0.5604 0.5044 
 (0.325) (0.499) (0.453) 
Never smoked -0.0624 0.0607 -0.0845 
 (0.118) (0.169) (0.180) 
Used to smoke but stopped -0.0914 -0.1684 0.0204 
 (0.125) (0.168) (0.201) 
Low weight (BMI 18.5 or less) 0.7346 1.4493 0.5247 
 (0.514) (1.081) (0.601) 
Overweight (BMI between 25 and 29.9) 0.1262 0.1097 0.1133 
 (0.104) (0.149) (0.153) 
Obese (BMI 30 or more) 0.0967 0.1647 -0.0937 
 (0.140) (0.202) (0.212) 
Received a light diagnosis 0.0964 0.1405 0.0803 
 (0.101) (0.141) (0.154) 
Received a severe diagnosis -0.7297*** -0.6493* -0.6229* 
 (0.247) (0.348) (0.370) 
absolute value of grip strength difference 0.0061 0.0127 -0.0219 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.022) 
Result on numeracy test 0.0237 -0.0823 0.0940 
 (0.051) (0.073) (0.076) 
country identifier = 12, Germany -1.4475*** -1.1460** -2.3357*** 
 (0.302) (0.447) (0.458) 
country identifier = 13, Sweden -2.0948*** -1.8740*** -2.8616*** 
 (0.294) (0.447) (0.436) 
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country identifier = 14, Netherlands -1.5507*** -1.2260*** -2.5115*** 
 (0.307) (0.448) (0.480) 
country identifier = 15, Spain -1.9408*** -1.6816*** -2.8876*** 
 (0.371) (0.517) (0.626) 
country identifier = 16, Italy -1.1096*** -0.7081 -1.9507*** 
 (0.321) (0.466) (0.505) 
country identifier = 17, France -0.7079** 0.0649 -1.3851*** 
 (0.291) (0.488) (0.394) 
country identifier = 18, Denmark -1.6666*** -1.6429*** -2.2092*** 
 (0.295) (0.440) (0.447) 
country identifier = 19, Greece -2.6172*** -2.3848*** -2.8844*** 
 (0.377) (0.518) (0.629) 
country identifier = 20, Switzerland -2.0672*** -1.7449*** -2.9246*** 
 (0.338) (0.499) (0.510) 
country identifier = 21, 21 0.0133 0.1238 -0.1847 
 (0.313) (0.491) (0.434) 
country identifier = 22, 22 -0.1349 -0.4402 0.2925 
 (0.337) (0.519) (0.474) 
country identifier = 23, Belgium -1.0313*** -0.6949 -1.8411*** 
 (0.294) (0.435) (0.448) 
Partner is working 0.4760 0.5405 0.4407 
 (0.360) (0.631) (0.462) 
Partner is retired 0.7891** 0.8599 0.8389* 
 (0.366) (0.655) (0.463) 
Partner is unemployed 0.7369* 0.7890 0.6542 
 (0.429) (0.709) (0.606) 
Partner is sick or disabled 0.6640 0.6815 0.5707 
 (0.423) (0.707) (0.581) 
Partner is a home maker 0.7870** 0.7580 0.6011 
 (0.386) (0.646) (1.102) 
Divorced 0.3326 0.2625 0.4242 
 (0.375) (0.669) (0.470) 
Widowed 0.6246 0.8369 0.4977 
 (0.397) (0.711) (0.500) 
    
Observations 5,645 2,828 2,815 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE A6: results using only those below retirement age 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Full sample Men Women 
    
Age -0.0769* -0.0034 -0.0931 
 (0.046) (0.062) (0.060) 
Age squared 0.0010** 0.0004 0.0012** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Male -0.0195*   
  (0.010)   
Foreign born -0.0435** -0.0595** -0.0348 
 (0.017) (0.027) (0.021) 
Number of children -0.0131*** -0.0161** -0.0111* 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) 
Number of grandchildren 0.0052** 0.0089** 0.0022 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) 
Mother alive -0.0032 -0.0123 0.0057 
 (0.008) (0.012) (0.012) 
Father alive 0.0088 -0.0027 0.0195 
 (0.011) (0.017) (0.015) 
Works 0-10 hours per week -0.0233 0.0455 -0.0434 
 (0.024) (0.043) (0.030) 
Works 11-20 hours per week -0.0086 -0.0477 0.0205 
 (0.016) (0.037) (0.018) 
Works 21-30 hours per week 0.0115 -0.0062 0.0302** 
 (0.013) (0.024) (0.015) 
Works 41-50 hours per week -0.0251** -0.0424*** -0.0057 
 (0.010) (0.014) (0.015) 
Works more than 50 hours per week -0.0683*** -0.0724*** -0.0607** 
 (0.017) (0.022) (0.031) 
wave = 2 0.0679*** 0.0777*** 0.0556*** 
 (0.010) (0.015) (0.013) 
Low education 0.0009 -0.0060 0.0051 
 (0.011) (0.016) (0.014) 
High education -0.0091 -0.0209 0.0048 
 (0.011) (0.015) (0.015) 
income_decile = 1 -0.0479** 0.0095 -0.0968*** 
 (0.024) (0.033) (0.035) 
income_decile = 2 -0.0200 0.0131 -0.0480 
 (0.027) (0.043) (0.036) 
income_decile = 4 -0.0079 0.0593* -0.0718** 
 (0.024) (0.034) (0.033) 
income_decile = 5 -0.0286 0.0235 -0.0712** 
 (0.022) (0.030) (0.030) 
income_decile = 6 -0.0254 0.0467* -0.0905*** 
 (0.021) (0.028) (0.030) 
income_decile = 7 -0.0075 0.0517* -0.0539* 
 (0.021) (0.027) (0.031) 
income_decile = 8 -0.0056 0.0430 -0.0448 
 (0.021) (0.027) (0.030) 
income_decile = 9 0.0147 0.0819*** -0.0391 
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 (0.021) (0.027) (0.030) 
income_decile = 10 -0.0122 0.0499* -0.0669** 
 (0.021) (0.028) (0.030) 
Expected replacement rate <50% -0.0315* -0.0063 -0.0493** 
 (0.017) (0.025) (0.025) 
Expected replacement rate 51-75% 0.0100 0.0115 0.0090 
 (0.010) (0.016) (0.014) 
Expected replacement rate 75-100% 0.0363*** 0.0387** 0.0306* 
 (0.012) (0.017) (0.016) 
Expected replacement rate >100% 0.0356*** 0.0523*** 0.0139 
 (0.013) (0.019) (0.018) 
More than 10 years to retirement age -0.0203 -0.0291 0.0673* 
 (0.025) (0.043) (0.036) 
5-10 years to retirement age -0.0111 -0.0216 0.0200 
 (0.014) (0.023) (0.019) 
jobtype = 0 0.0784 0.0958 0.0035 
 (0.051) (0.059) (0.089) 
jobtype = 1 0.0204 0.0135 0.0178 
 (0.016) (0.024) (0.026) 
jobtype = 2 0.0160 -0.0046 0.0227 
 (0.016) (0.025) (0.021) 
jobtype = 3 0.0303** 0.0185 0.0243 
 (0.014) (0.022) (0.019) 
jobtype = 4 0.0217 0.0291 0.0173 
 (0.014) (0.028) (0.016) 
jobtype = 6 0.0724*** 0.0314 0.1005*** 
 (0.027) (0.041) (0.033) 
jobtype = 7 0.0347** 0.0133 0.0810** 
 (0.017) (0.023) (0.037) 
jobtype = 8 0.0548*** 0.0291 0.1175** 
 (0.021) (0.026) (0.048) 
jobtype = 9 0.0013 0.0238 -0.0154 
 (0.016) (0.028) (0.019) 
Self-rated Health = 1 -0.0270** -0.0267 -0.0298* 
 (0.013) (0.018) (0.018) 
Self-rated Health = 2 -0.0301*** -0.0246* -0.0306** 
 (0.010) (0.014) (0.013) 
Self-rated Health = 4 0.0056 -0.0032 0.0135 
 (0.014) (0.021) (0.019) 
Self-rated Health = 5 -0.0039 -0.0613* 0.0514 
 (0.028) (0.034) (0.040) 
Never smoked -0.0022 0.0138 -0.0110 
 (0.010) (0.015) (0.014) 
Used to smoke but stopped -0.0063 -0.0118 0.0018 
 (0.011) (0.015) (0.016) 
Low weight (BMI 18.5 or less) 0.0574* 0.1242** 0.0301 
 (0.033) (0.055) (0.035) 
Overweight (BMI between 25 and 29.9) 0.0057 0.0035 0.0036 
 (0.009) (0.013) (0.012) 
Obese (BMI 30 or more) 0.0054 0.0104 -0.0087 
 (0.012) (0.018) (0.016) 
Received a light diagnosis 0.0062 0.0145 0.0014 
 (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) 
Received a severe diagnosis -0.0690*** -0.0658* -0.0453 
 (0.023) (0.035) (0.030) 
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absolute value of grip strength difference 0.0006 0.0013 -0.0017 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Result on numeracy test 0.0009 -0.0092 0.0071 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.006) 
country identifier = 12, Germany -0.1559*** -0.1225** -0.2424*** 
 (0.034) (0.049) (0.050) 
country identifier = 13, Sweden -0.2041*** -0.1699*** -0.2824*** 
 (0.033) (0.049) (0.048) 
country identifier = 14, Netherlands -0.1599*** -0.1221** -0.2530*** 
 (0.035) (0.050) (0.051) 
country identifier = 15, Spain -0.1891*** -0.1596*** -0.2667*** 
 (0.037) (0.052) (0.058) 
country identifier = 16, Italy -0.1096*** -0.0664 -0.2014*** 
 (0.038) (0.056) (0.053) 
country identifier = 17, France -0.0921*** -0.0061 -0.1714*** 
 (0.036) (0.059) (0.049) 
country identifier = 18, Denmark -0.1671*** -0.1568*** -0.2277*** 
 (0.034) (0.049) (0.050) 
country identifier = 19, Greece -0.2241*** -0.2040*** -0.2533*** 
 (0.036) (0.052) (0.059) 
country identifier = 20, Switzerland -0.1925*** -0.1534*** -0.2697*** 
 (0.035) (0.052) (0.049) 
country identifier = 21, 21 0.0085 0.0216 -0.0223 
 (0.039) (0.058) (0.057) 
country identifier = 22, 22 -0.0230 -0.0482 0.0241 
 (0.042) (0.058) (0.065) 
country identifier = 23, Belgium -0.1195*** -0.0812 -0.2066*** 
 (0.035) (0.051) (0.053) 
Partner is working 0.0568 0.0647 0.0490 
 (0.038) (0.083) (0.036) 
Partner is retired 0.0872** 0.0982 0.0834** 
 (0.038) (0.084) (0.036) 
Partner is unemployed 0.0773* 0.0811 0.0697 
 (0.043) (0.089) (0.045) 
Partner is sick or disabled 0.0784* 0.0812 0.0638 
 (0.042) (0.088) (0.046) 
Partner is a home maker 0.0840** 0.0840 0.1201 
 (0.040) (0.084) (0.110) 
Divorced 0.0430 0.0339 0.0447 
 (0.039) (0.086) (0.037) 
Widowed 0.0609 0.0825 0.0403 
 (0.041) (0.089) (0.040) 
    
Observations 5,457 2,726 2,731 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
  
41 
 
TABLE A7: results including desire to retire early 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Full sample Men Women 
    
looking for early retirement 0.0753*** 0.0773*** 0.0699*** 
 (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) 
Age 0.0121 0.0974** -0.0176 
 (0.042) (0.047) (0.073) 
Age squared 0.0002 -0.0005 0.0005 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Male -0.0169   
 (0.010)   
Foreign born -0.0369** -0.0540** -0.0300 
 (0.016) (0.026) (0.020) 
Number of children -0.0127*** -0.0133** -0.0121** 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) 
Number of grandchildren 0.0047* 0.0073** 0.0024 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) 
Mother alive -0.0074 -0.0132 -0.0025 
 (0.008) (0.012) (0.012) 
Father alive 0.0047 -0.0075 0.0149 
 (0.012) (0.018) (0.016) 
Works 0-10 hours per week -0.0145 0.0044 -0.0068 
 (0.024) (0.047) (0.027) 
Works 11-20 hours per week -0.0041 -0.0301 0.0178 
 (0.016) (0.033) (0.018) 
Works 21-30 hours per week 0.0109 -0.0017 0.0243 
 (0.013) (0.024) (0.015) 
Works 41-50 hours per week -0.0182* -0.0336** -0.0019 
 (0.010) (0.014) (0.015) 
Works more than 50 hours per week -0.0631*** -0.0769*** -0.0350 
 (0.016) (0.021) (0.028) 
wave = 2 0.0794*** 0.0913*** 0.0616*** 
 (0.010) (0.015) (0.014) 
Low education 0.0013 -0.0070 0.0066 
 (0.011) (0.016) (0.015) 
High education -0.0073 -0.0182 0.0046 
 (0.011) (0.015) (0.015) 
income_decile = 1 -0.0498** 0.0187 -0.1053*** 
 (0.025) (0.034) (0.035) 
income_decile = 2 -0.0182 0.0244 -0.0522 
 (0.027) (0.045) (0.034) 
income_decile = 4 -0.0152 0.0540 -0.0746** 
 (0.025) (0.035) (0.033) 
income_decile = 5 -0.0292 0.0237 -0.0718** 
 (0.023) (0.031) (0.030) 
income_decile = 6 -0.0226 0.0576* -0.0874*** 
 (0.022) (0.030) (0.030) 
income_decile = 7 -0.0082 0.0563* -0.0567* 
 (0.022) (0.030) (0.031) 
income_decile = 8 -0.0144 0.0377 -0.0493 
 (0.022) (0.029) (0.031) 
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income_decile = 9 0.0108 0.0777*** -0.0415 
 (0.022) (0.029) (0.030) 
income_decile = 10 -0.0056 0.0564* -0.0572* 
 (0.022) (0.030) (0.030) 
Expected replacement rate <50% -0.0349** -0.0202 -0.0420* 
 (0.017) (0.024) (0.023) 
Expected replacement rate 51-75% 0.0093 0.0081 0.0110 
 (0.010) (0.015) (0.014) 
Expected replacement rate 75-100% 0.0389*** 0.0337** 0.0371** 
 (0.012) (0.016) (0.016) 
Expected replacement rate >100% 0.0292** 0.0397** 0.0145 
 (0.013) (0.019) (0.019) 
More than 10 years to retirement age 0.0459 0.0506 0.1597*** 
 (0.038) (0.062) (0.053) 
5-10 years to retirement age 0.0444 0.0409 0.1016** 
 (0.030) (0.045) (0.044) 
1-4 years to retirement age 0.0751*** 0.0762** 0.1013*** 
 (0.024) (0.034) (0.035) 
5-10 years above retirement age -0.2127*** -0.1305* -0.2519** 
 (0.058) (0.072) (0.099) 
10 or more years above retirement age -0.6069*** -0.2798  
 (0.183) (0.218)  
jobtype = 0 0.0945** 0.1230** -0.0085 
 (0.048) (0.050) (0.102) 
jobtype = 1 0.0176 0.0193 0.0091 
 (0.016) (0.024) (0.026) 
jobtype = 2 0.0206 0.0060 0.0232 
 (0.016) (0.025) (0.021) 
jobtype = 3 0.0240* 0.0160 0.0194 
 (0.015) (0.023) (0.020) 
jobtype = 4 0.0155 0.0281 0.0101 
 (0.014) (0.028) (0.016) 
jobtype = 6 0.0644*** 0.0284 0.0829*** 
 (0.025) (0.037) (0.032) 
jobtype = 7 0.0294* 0.0135 0.0721** 
 (0.017) (0.024) (0.035) 
jobtype = 8 0.0534*** 0.0366 0.1138** 
 (0.021) (0.027) (0.048) 
jobtype = 9 0.0021 0.0244 -0.0123 
 (0.016) (0.028) (0.019) 
Self-rated Health = 1 -0.0182 -0.0224 -0.0138 
 (0.013) (0.018) (0.018) 
Self-rated Health = 2 -0.0175* -0.0172 -0.0143 
 (0.010) (0.014) (0.013) 
Self-rated Health = 4 -0.0076 -0.0218 0.0100 
 (0.014) (0.021) (0.018) 
Self-rated Health = 5 -0.0154 -0.0554 0.0244 
 (0.025) (0.034) (0.034) 
Never smoked -0.0016 0.0087 -0.0026 
 (0.010) (0.015) (0.014) 
Used to smoke but stopped -0.0084 -0.0160 0.0010 
 (0.011) (0.015) (0.016) 
Low weight (BMI 18.5 or less) 0.0640* 0.1539*** 0.0351 
 (0.034) (0.058) (0.033) 
Overweight (BMI between 25 and 29.9) 0.0074 0.0090 0.0027 
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 (0.009) (0.013) (0.012) 
Obese (BMI 30 or more) 0.0068 0.0142 -0.0095 
 (0.012) (0.018) (0.017) 
Received a light diagnosis 0.0065 0.0097 0.0065 
 (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) 
Received a severe diagnosis -0.0574** -0.0474 -0.0470 
 (0.023) (0.033) (0.032) 
absolute value of grip strength difference 0.0002 0.0008 -0.0020 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Result on numeracy test 0.0024 -0.0060 0.0073 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.006) 
country identifier = 12, Germany -0.1389*** -0.1011** -0.2211*** 
 (0.033) (0.048) (0.049) 
country identifier = 13, Sweden -0.1880*** -0.1597*** -0.2556*** 
 (0.032) (0.047) (0.047) 
country identifier = 14, Netherlands -0.1430*** -0.1107** -0.2244*** 
 (0.034) (0.049) (0.050) 
country identifier = 15, Spain -0.1882*** -0.1558*** -0.2694*** 
 (0.036) (0.051) (0.055) 
country identifier = 16, Italy -0.1134*** -0.0580 -0.2031*** 
 (0.037) (0.055) (0.051) 
country identifier = 17, France -0.0865*** 0.0067 -0.1660*** 
 (0.033) (0.055) (0.046) 
country identifier = 18, Denmark -0.1539*** -0.1367*** -0.2139*** 
 (0.033) (0.048) (0.049) 
country identifier = 19, Greece -0.2272*** -0.2048*** -0.2610*** 
 (0.035) (0.050) (0.059) 
country identifier = 20, Switzerland -0.1839*** -0.1515*** -0.2544*** 
 (0.033) (0.050) (0.048) 
country identifier = 21, 21 0.0162 0.0372 -0.0115 
 (0.038) (0.056) (0.054) 
country identifier = 22, 22 -0.0210 -0.0445 0.0230 
 (0.041) (0.057) (0.062) 
country identifier = 23, Belgium -0.0952*** -0.0550 -0.1769*** 
 (0.034) (0.050) (0.052) 
Partner is working 0.0282 0.0324 0.0239 
 (0.032) (0.066) (0.033) 
Partner is retired 0.0576* 0.0614 0.0579* 
 (0.033) (0.067) (0.034) 
Partner is unemployed 0.0517 0.0596 0.0346 
 (0.039) (0.073) (0.044) 
Partner is sick or disabled 0.0456 0.0478 0.0328 
 (0.038) (0.073) (0.045) 
Partner is a home maker 0.0497 0.0482 0.0464 
 (0.035) (0.067) (0.114) 
Divorced 0.0255 0.0217 0.0279 
 (0.033) (0.068) (0.035) 
Widowed 0.0443 0.0635 0.0318 
 (0.036) (0.072) (0.038) 
    
Observations 5,645 2,828 2,815 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
